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consists of three representatives of the major political parties, six 
people drawn from 'the great and good' and a chairman who, so 
far, has been a lawyer.
The committee's first report went straight to the moral issue 
and laid down seven principles of public life (the principles are 
set out in full at p. 14 of the report). These are as follows:
  selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, 
honesty and leadership.
The House of Commons adopted these and they have been 
widely incorporated in other codes.
As regards the bribery of MPs, the report called tor a 
reconsideration ot the issue. It recommended the adoption of 
better procedures for 'trying' MPs accused of misconduct. The 
report looked at the corruption statutes and called for their 
reconsideration and consolidation. It also dealt with quangos 
and the issue of political bias in the selection of members of 
quangos.
Recommendations were included for the appointment of a 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards for the House of 
Commons and an independent Public Appointments 
Commissioner to regulate the public appointments process. 
Both recommendations were accepted. The holders of the 
respective offices are Sir Gordon Downey and Sir Leonard 
Peach.
The committee's third report looked at local government 
(Standards of Conduct in Local Government in England, Scotland, and 
Wales: Third Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, 
July 1997, Cm 3702-1). In that report the committee called for 
better codes of discipline. It criticised the system of surcharging
local councillors and proposed a new crime of abuse of public 
office.
During the last few months the committee has been looking at 
the funding of political parties (Fifth Report (1998)). This 
obviously includes issues which I have mentioned today, i.e. the 
sources of funding, the processing of honours and perceived 
fears as to the influences being brought to bear on party leaders 
in consequence of the 'arms race' to fight elections on a lavish 
scale.
The recommendations contained in the first three reports of 
the committee have had the effect of stimulating much further 
activity. In addition there is nowr a climate of opinion which 
favours the modernisation of the law in the ongoing crusade 
against corruption and malpractice. Examples are furnished by 
Lord Nicholls' Committee of both Houses which is looking at 
the issue of bribery of MPs and members of the House of Lords; 
the Law Commission's Report Legislating the Criminal Code: 
Corruption (Law Com No 248, HC 524, 2 March 1998); and a 
Home Office Working Party is currently looking at a new 
criminal offence of 'abuse' of public office. And there is much 
else besides in addition to the ongoing labours of the OECD and 
its fight against corruption.
I hope that I have said enough to arouse your interest in the 
work of the Committee on Standards in Public Life and to 
demonstrate its relevance to the moral and legal issues addressed 
in the course of the symposium.  
Patrick Neill QC
Prosecution white collar 
crime - what's going on?
by Rosalind Wright
In her address to the Symposium on Economic Crime, the Director of the 
Serious Fraud Office posed the question 'What is wrong with the present 
system of trying serious and complex fraud cases?'
Lord Roskill, in his report on fraud trials 13 years ago, noted that:
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'criticisms of the judicial process in the present context have stemmed 
largely from the increasing length and complexity of trials of commercial 
fraud cases, leading many people to call into question the 
appropriateness of trial by jury for this type of case.'
In that context, nothing has changed very significantly and in 
1998, the problems of long and complex trials remains.
The Serious Fraud Office was set up in 1987 as a direct result 
of Roskill. It was given a specific and focused remit for the 
investigation and prosecution of serious and complex fraud. It 
investigates and prosecutes the very tip of the fraud iceberg   the 
most serious, the most complex cases   cases "where there is
significant public interest, where the sums at risk exceed £lm 
(sometimes by a hundredfold), where there is often a trans- 
national element; a highly complex and esoteric market 
background, where the complexities of commercial transactions, 
of audit trails and market knowledge combine to produce cases 
of great diffculty and enormous size.
HOW ARE THE CHALLENGES MET?
From the SFO's perspective, remarkably successfully; in our 
ten and a half year history, we have convicted two out of every 
three defendants prosecuted. Overall, the picture is not so rosy.
As far as the trial process is concerned things have not really 
moved a great deal further forward since the days before Roskill. 
Trials are still taking months rather than weeks to try. 
Preparatory hearings, designed to streamline the issues and 
reach accord on what could be agreed by both sides before trial, 
are not working as well as they should. Defence Counsel are 
reluctant to concede points pre-trial. In many cases one is driven 
to the conclusion that it is in the defence's interests to prolong 
the trial process for as long as possible   not only is it putting off 
the evil day of possible conviction   but in keeping the issues 
blurred and unclear, the jury may not be able to see the wood 
for the trees and give the defendant the benefit of the doubt.
THE ISSUES THEMSELVES
The facts in many complex fraud cases don't lend themselves 
to brevity and simplicity. Sustained and successful frauds often 
involve repeated deceptions and dishonesties in many 
transactions over a long period of time. To seek to reflect all the 
deceptions and dishonesties in the indictment would make the 
charges incomprehensible and the trial unmanageable both in its 
length and complexity. The inevitable consequence of this has 
been that the prosecution, often with the agreement of the 
defence, tends to reduce the indictment to a number of sample 
charges or will try part of a story with other parts to follow later 
in later indictments. This approach makes the dish for the jury 
digestible but the jury doesn't see the whole picture. This 
suggests that there are certain complex fraud trials where a jury 
is not appropriate. If the trial can't be presented before a jury 
without its reduction to digestible bites the jury may not convict 
without seeing the whole picture.
CLOUT IS NEEDED
It needs a judge of considerable clout... to manage a fraud trial firmly 
and knock heads together ... to determine what issues are truly in 
dispute and to prune the case to its bare bones.
In any case, it is often difficult for the prosecution to proceed 
to the second indictment if it has failed on the first. There is the 
feeling that the prosecution has proceeded on its best case first 
and the prosecution may be permitted to get only one bite at the 
cherry, as in Maxwell where the SFO were not allowed to proceed 
on the second indictment.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeal felt that the Blue Arrow 
trial was too long (1 3 months) and the indictment too complex 
for the jury to understand, and it therefore quashed the 
convictions.
If Maxwell is to be followed, there is likely to be no value to 
adopting a proactive approach to severance as severed matters 
are unlikely to be allowed to proceed. This leaves us with an even 
more finely balanced decision to make   ensuring that there is a 
sufficiently substantial case to reflect the criminality of those 
involved   while at the same time keeping the trial as short and 
simple as possible for the jury.
THE NATURE OF THE CHARGE
When it's not clear what the criminal offence one is trying to 
prove is, how is a jury to be expected to extrapolate, from the 
facts of commercial transactions, the criminality of what is 
alleged? Do such concepts as 'procuring the execution of a 
valuable security by deception' or 'the dishonest appropriation 
of a chose in action' really belong in the 20th, let alone the 2 1st 
century?
There is a huge litany of possible offences to choose from in a 
fraud case, none of which necessarily meets the bill when 
technology produces a revolutionary concept such as electronic- 
bank transfers which extinguish a credit in one bank account and 
open up a new one in another one so that 'property' is not 
obtained for the purpose of a charge under s. 15 of the Theft Act 
1968   that was the case in Preddy — or where a computer 
automatically pays out against a fraudulent request   no human 
intervention, so no person was capable of being deceived.
The law must keep pace with technological development. We 
have, as an Office, made representations to the Law 
Commission, which is presently examining the law of dishonesty, 
in the hope that they will recommend a comprehensive 
substantive offence of fraud. Where there is a conspiracy 
between two or more people, you can present all the facts 
together; where only a single defendant is involved, you are not 
able to do that.
Modern commercial activities and the modern methods by 
which dishonesty may be effected makes one constantly worry 
that the law we have may not be able to cope. The criminal law 
does not at present touch the increasing prevalence of 
commercial espionage both by computer and otherwise. I would 
welcome the extension of the criminal law to this area and I 
hope the Law Commission's recommendations find favour or, 
perhaps better, that commercial espionage can be brought within 
our recommended offence of 'fraud'.
OVERSEAS EVIDENCE
Another problem the SFO has to grapple with when trying to 
mount a case against a defendant in a serious or complex fraud 
case is evidence from overseas. As I have said, very many of our 
cases   usually about 60 or 70% of them   involve evidence or a 
defendant who is outside the jurisdiction. We need evidence 
from overseas, we need defendants from overseas, we need 
mutual legal assistance, we need speedier extradition. In many 
cases we are developing relations with other countries, notably 
with other European countries, so that we are able now as we 
weren't a few years ago, to get the sort of evidence in the form 
that we are able to present to an English Court; but the disparity 
in the procedures in different jurisdictions is still marked.
Again, getting witnesses to come over from an overseas 
jurisdiction to give evidence before an English court is another
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huge problem. We don't have the power to compel a witness to 
give evidence as we could if they were within the jurisdiction. 
The reluctance to come overseas to become involved in a UK 
trial is understandable; again, after all, what is it to an overseas 
witness that somebody else is being investigated and prosecuted 
in the UK?
The co-operation we receive from most countries is 
improving, due I am sure to the assistance we are able to offer 
overseas authorities to obtain evidence for them, including the 
use of our powers under Criminal Justice Act 1987, s. 2 to obtain 
evidence on compulsion; but the level of co-operation does vary 
enormously. Some countries are only too happy to help but 
others are much more reluctant and are in any case inundated 
with requests for assistance and aren't able to give us speedily the 
co-operation we need.
MANAGING THE DOCUMENTATION
The biggest problem that we face in the longest cases is the 
unmanageability of the evidence itself. In most cases we are faced 
with a huge number of files. The documentation in fraud cases 
is, I think, what marks them out as different from any other class 
of case. One of the great drawbacks of the jury system is that the 
jury is not able to take these files away before the trial starts and 
read through the documentation. One great advantage of a 
tribunal panel system, such as you have in the regulatory areas, 
is that you are able to give the regulatory tribunal all the files and 
documentation well in advance of the hearing of the disciplinary 
case and they are able, three or four weeks before the tribunal 
sits, to have read and understood the background to the case. 
The jury is not able to do that and that in itself prolongs the 
hearing.
The SFO is installing a document management system which 
will scan all the documentation that is produced in the course of 
an investigation and make it available on a CD-ROM. It will be 
readily accessible by means of automatic indexing and word 
recognition. Instead of presenting huge numbers of lever arch 
files to the defence   the number of copies multiplied by as 
many defendants as there are in a case   each defendant and the 
judge and the jury too, will be given a CD-ROM. The same will 
apply to unused material that we have to disclose, indexed and 
accessible much more easily and quickly than it was on paper and 
will not take up the huge acreage of space in the court and our 
own office. That in itself will save an enormous amount of time, 
space and temper.
JUDGES
Fraud trial judges are the essential lynchpin of a successful 
case. To have an efficiently, effectively and economically run case, 
you need for these cases a judge who can not only understand 
commercial transactions in a wide range of markets, but be a 
master of the increasingly complicated legal issues in this field 
and, above all, capable of effective management of the trial 
process. It needs a judge of considerable clout   of experience 
and ability but above all determination and personality to 
manage a fraud trial firmly and knock heads together and that 
includes the prosecution's head, to determine what issues are 
truly in dispute and to prune the case to its bare bones without 
losing the essential elements of the alleged criminality. I am 
delighted that the Lord Chancellor's Department has made a 
start in tackling this sensitive area.
JURIES
The time has now come to consider a replacement for the jury 
in the most complex and the most lengthy of these cases. And it's 
not because   and I must stress this   too many defendants are 
acquitted. We have, after all, secured convictions in every trial 
we have prosecuted in the last two years. Anyway, an acquittal in 
a criminal trial is not a disaster for the prosecution, it doesn't 
mean the case should never have been brought or was 
inadequately prosecuted. Whether the verdict is one with which 
I, as the prosecutor, or the judge or counsel or anybody else 
agrees or disagrees is beside the point. I don't, and I wouldn't, 
criticise a jury system because an individual jury has acquitted a 
defendant in one of our cases. Neither is the issue as to whether 
the jury is able to understand complex commercial transactions 
in complicated financial instruments. It's a common belief that 
the facts of these cases are too difficult for a jury to understand. 
Whether that's true or not is something we just don't know. 
Until controlled research is allowed we can only guess why a jury 
decides as they do.
In less complicated days the judges were able to direct the 
prosecution to pick three stages in a series of transactions, one 
at the beginning, one in the middle and one at the end, 
representing say, perhaps a hundred individual incidences of 
theft by an employee. The cases that the SFO handles aren't as 
simple as that.
To demonstrate and understand the allegations in those cases, 
it's necessary to understand what happened over a period of 
months or sometimes years, in a complex series of commercial 
transactions. It's in those very few cases that I think the criminal 
justice system is falling down at the moment. It hasn't yet caught 
up with the pace of modern developments in commercial 
business life and, as they have become more complex, so have 
the ways of committing offences. The process of trial by jury has 
simply become too unwieldy.
INTO THE 21ST CENTURY
Do such concepts as 'procuring the execution of a valuable security 
by deception' or 'the dishonest appropriation of a chose in action' 
really belong in the 20th, let alone the 21st century?
The Home Office has issued a consultation paper setting out 
suggested alternatives to trial by 12 jury members. My own 
preference would be a judge sitting with specially qualified lay 
members, not specialist assessors drawn from the area of 
business that is the subject matter of the case, as is the rule for 
regulatory disciplinary tribunals. I don't think that's an 
appropriate way to try these cases. What you're getting there are 
expert witnesses who can't be tested. You don't know how up to 
date the business experience is of these people who sit with the 
judge; they are continually feeding the judge (who is, in this sort 
of case, a layman himself as far as commercial or financial 
knowledge is concerned) market knowledge which may be out of 
date: it may be wrong, it may be full of prejudice   you don't 
know because you can't test it. If you call an expert witness from 
the area of business concerned he can be examined by the 
prosecution, he can be cross-examined by the defence, you 
know what he's saying, you know where he's coming from, you 
can test his evidence; but you can't do that when you've got 
experts sitting as part of the tribunal with the judge.
My preference would be for a financially or commercially- 
aware lay member, somebody with a banking background, 
somebody with an accountancy background, somebody with a 
stock-broking background, but sitting in a case wrhere that sort 
of background is directly pertinent to the charges brought. But 
they would be informed, they would have the business 
experience. You wouldn't have to tell them what a share option 
was, what reinsurance was all about   or if you did they'd 
understand pretty quickly.
Now, whether a case is suitable for jury trial or for the 
alternative mode should be a decision for the judge to take, 
following the argument from both prosecution and the defence 
and subject to interlocutory appeal. A High Court judge with 
experience of both commercial and criminal cases should be 
selected to try these very special and exceptional cases.
Whatever system is put in place to 
try these cases must command 
public confidence. There is public 
scepticism of setting up a possible 
'softer option' of trial for what 
people might call 'the toffs' and the 
traditional system for ordinary blue 
collar criminals. If there were 
acquittals, or lightish sentences of 
fraud defendants, you would hear 
again the old phrase, that this is a 
system of chaps letting off other 
chaps over lunch. They can get 
away with millions and get their 
wrists slapped, whereas an ordinary 
blue collar criminal who goes in 
with a gun and robs somebody at gunpoint of say, £10, goes to 
prison for 15 years; which doesn't happen to the suits.
THE REGULATORY ROLE IN FRAUD
When does the regulator take over conduct of these complex 
cases and take them out of the criminal arena? The recent case 
of NatWest Markets illustrates the dilemma facing the regulatory 
and criminal authorities in deciding who should take on 
responsibility for investigating an allegation arising out of a 
spectacular loss, apparently occasioned on a trading desk and 
'covered up' by employees. There are clear guidelines on this 
area drawn up by the SFO and the SIB for determination, in 
cases where there is an overlap between the criminal and the 
regulatory functions, as to where priority for action should be 
assigned.
Where 'priority' is accorded, it may mean that the body, either 
the SFO or one of the financial services regulating organisations, 
can expect to be left clear to proceed. The other body may be 
'on hold' until either the other body has decided not to proceed 
further, or the stage is reached where intervention by the other 
body may safely proceed without prejudice to action by the first 
one. In some cases, the regulator may proceed with 'fringe' 
players, or corporations, while priority is still accorded to the 
prosecutor in respect of the ringleaders.
We are at a turning point in terms of regulation. The new 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) is to be given enhanced and 
very impressive powers. The FSA will have the power to make 
anyone caught breaching the new proposed Code oj Market Abuse 
disgorge any profits made, or loss avoided as a result of the
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breach; restore the position or otherwise compensate any 
identifiable victims of misconduct, and/or make them pay a fine 
aimed at deterring such misconduct and pay the costs incurred 
by the FSA in the investigation of the conduct in question. They 
will also have criminal powers which, at the moment, are the 
province either of the CPS and the SFO, but particularly the DTI 
in relation to insider dealing; they will also be able to prosecute 
certain forms of market abuse. As well as being able to take 
regulatory or civil action against abusers they will also be able to 
take criminal action against abusers; also to take criminal action 
against people for abusing money-laundering regulations and, as 
they do at the moment   policing the perimeter   that is, 
prosecute those who are unlicensed or who are unauthorised.
These are pretty' awesome powers and we will have to see how 
readily the FSA decides to take up the cudgels and use them. The 
regulatory system has worked well in keeping out those people 
who should not be let loose on the investing public and 
particularly this relates to individuals who should not be 
employed in investment firms. The regulators have taken 
effective disciplinary action to stop firms and individuals who 
breach normal standards of market conduct. But if the time 
comes for the FSA to decide to bring criminal action for market 
manipulation or for insider dealing, I hope they have more 
success than the DTI have had with insider dealing cases. Insider 
dealing, as defined in the Criminal Justice Act 1993 is a pretty 
unprosecutable offence.
The advantage of dealing with these matters in a regulatory 
rather than a criminal way is that the regulator doesn't have the 
constraints of the criminal prosecutor who has to prove the 
mens rea of a crime   the dishonest intent   and the 
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Secondly, the 
regulator is concerned with high standards of market conduct, 
not solely those acts which demonstrate dishonesty; so care, skill 
and diligence are equally important concerns of the regulator   
so is integrity'   a wider concept than merely keeping within the 
strict ambit of the criminal law.
Regulatory action, rather than criminal prosecution, may 
prove in the end a more effective weapon for sure-fire attack on 
unacceptable market practices which have, in many cases, 
escaped the clutches of the criminal law enforcement agencies. 
The real added-value that the regulator brings to the 
investigation and prosecution of serious and complex financial 
fraud is its role in the early detection of fraudulent activity; the 
one element in the Roskill equation that I mentioned earlier that 
the SFO makes no attempt to undertake. The role of the 
regulator in constant vigilance, surveillance and monitoring, 
detects and, above all, goes a long way to prevent complex fraud 
in the first place.
ONE STOP SHOPPING?
To make criminal trials for fraud more effective, from the 
regulatory as well as the criminal points of view, I suggest that 
criminal judges can be given some of the powers of the 
regulators; intervention powers to close down seemingly 
fraudulentlv run businesses, or limit some of their commercial 
activities at an early stage; freezing the assets of a company or of 
an individual defendant before any criminal charge is made; 
being able to impose disqualification not only as a company 
director, but in a wider context, as the regulator now can do, 
under Financial Services Act 1986, s. 59   a comprehensive 15
'banning order' a blacklisting from all commercial and financial 
activities. And what about increased and more meaningful 
powers to award compensation to those who are victims of 
financial crime?
It seems to me that an enormous duplication of effort goes 
into the criminal investigation and trial of an offender, who is 
reluctant to enter a plea to the criminal charges he faces because 
he is uncertain whether the regulators will have another go at 
him and take him off the road for unacceptable conduct. If he 
has a sporting chance of an acquittal on the criminal charge he 
may as well chance his arm with the regulator later. But this way 
the trial judge, who had considered the prosecution's case and 
the defence's (now hopefully fuller) defence statement, would 
be able to offer a comprehensive package to the defence: a term 
of imprisonment, the payment of a specified amount of money 
to the victims ot the fraud and a regulatory penalty   perhaps a 
limited restriction on his future activities in the financial 
markets   which the defendant would be able to consider and
maybe be advised to offer pleas in the sure knowledge that the 
buck, as it were, stops there.
CONCLUSION
I would like to end by quoting from the Denning Lecture, 
which the former Solicitor General pave last October, when he
o
said:
'Ensuring that the UK'sjinancial services sector retains and 
strengthens its regulation as a clean andjair place to do business is 
important to the economic well being of this country. It is vital if the 
UKJinancial services sector is to retain its competitiveness, Jlexibility 
and strength.. This requires ... both strong Jinancial regulation and an 
effective criminal justice system Jor dealing with those who break the 
law.' ©
Rosalind Wright
Director, Serious Fraud Office
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